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Blair: Blair: Struggle over Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings Continues:

THE STRUGGLE OVER
CONSOLIDATION OF
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
CONTINUES: THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
CHOOSES SIDES
Baesler v. ContinentalGrain Co.1

I. INTRODUCTION

In response to rising litigation costs and overburdened court dockets, parties
are realizing the opportunity to resolve disputes more efficiently through the use
of arbitration. 2 To ensure access to arbitration, parties are including provisions
in contracts requiring arbitration of future disputes. 3 Courts enforce these
agreements pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 4 originally adopted by
Congress in 1925, which officially acknowledged the validity of private
agreements to arbitrate. 5 As a result, courts are faced with procedural issues,
such as consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings, in their
attempt to
6
enforce the contracts in accordance with the parties' agreement.
The Baesler decision represents the Eighth Circuit entrant into the collection
of federal court decisions
dealing specifically with the consolidation of separate
7
arbitration proceedings.

1. 900 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1990).
2. Trowbridge, Arbitration in Our Litigious Society, 44 ARB. J. 59-60 (1989).
3. See generally Katz, Enforcing an ADR Clause-Are Good Intentions All You Have?, 26 Am.
Bus. J. 575 (1988).
4. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
5. id.
6. See generally MacKellar, To Consolidate or Not to Consolidate: A Study of FederalCourt
Decisions, 44 ARB. J. 15 (1989).
7. See cases cited infra note 22.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING

LeRoy Baesler and other safflower producers entered into standard safflower
contracts with Continental Grain Company.8 Each contract between Continental
and the producers contained a clause requiring arbitration of controversies and
claims arising out of the agreement; however, the contracts were silent on the
issue of consolidation. 9 The producers purchased safflower seed from Continental, cultivated the safflower, and offered Continental the resulting crop.1 ° On the
basis of alleged sprout damage, Continental discounted the price and refused
acceptance of some of the safflower. 1 The producers,
individually, entered into
12
separate arbitration proceedings with Continental.
Baesler brought action against Continental in North Dakota state court
requesting consolidation of the separate arbitration proceedings. 13 Continental
removed the action to the United States district court, and Baesler moved for
summary judgment asking the court to consolidate the proceedings. 14 The
federal court granted Continental's summary judgment motion, concluding that it
15
lacked authority to order consolidation of arbitration hearings.
Baesler appealed the lower court decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 16 The appellate court, in interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act as
requiring federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements as they are written, sided
with the previous holdings of the Fifth,17 Ninth, 8 and Eleventh 1 9 Circuits
in denying the district court authority 20to consolidate the arbitration proceedings
absent a provision in the agreements.
The Eighth Circuit held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires
federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements as they are written, and where the
arbitration agreement does not provide for consolidation, a district court is without
21
the power to consolidate the proceedings.

8. Baesler, 900 F.2d at 1194.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987).
18. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1061 (1984).

19. See Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281 (11th Cir. 1989).
20. Baesler, 900 F.2d at 1195.

21. Id.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The issue of consolidation of arbitration proceedings is not a novel problem.
Several of the federal courts of appeal have addressed the issue with differing
conclusions; 22 these decisions were explicitly addressed in Baesler.23 Three
of the circuits that have addressed the issue of consolidation, the Fifth,
Ninth, and
24
Eleventh Circuits, have denied the courts the right to consolidate.
The Ninth Circuit dealt with a maritime contract arbitration issue in
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co35 In Weyerhaeuser, the
charterer sought to compel arbitration between it and the subcharterer and between
it and the shipowner.2 The agreements at issue contained arbitration clauses
that required only arbitration between the parties to the agreement. 27 In addition,
the agreement between the charterer and the owner contained an addendum
insulating the28 owner from any increase in its obligations by reason of any executed
subcharters.
The Weyerhaeuser court found its authority under the FAA to be narrowly
circumscribed; that is, the court may "only determine whether a written arbitration
agreement exists, and if it does, enforce it in accordance with its terms." 29 In
Weyerhaeuser, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's conclusion that the
parties
3° were not parties to a written arbitration agreement providing for consolidation.
The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in an insurance dispute in
Protective Life Insurance Corp. v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Corp.31 The
district court ordered consolidation of arbitration proceedings between Lincoln and
Protective and between Protective and a third party. 32 The Eleventh Circuit,
however, agreed with the previous Ninth Circuit decision in Weyerhaeuser, in
concluding that the power of federal courts, under the FAA, is "narrowly
circumscribed. "33 The Eleventh Circuit similarly held, "[p]arties may negotiate
for and include provisions for consolidation of arbitration proceedings in their

22. See Compania Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping, S.A., 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976) (consolidation permitted); Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d 635
(consolidation denied); Webb, 823 F.2d 145 (consolidation denied); New England Energy Inc. v.
Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988) (consolidation permitted); ProtectiveLife, 873 F.2d
281 (consolidation denied).
23. Baesler, 900 F.2d at 1194-95.
24. See Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d 635; Webb, 823 F.2d 145; Protective Life, 873 F.2d 281.
25. 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984).
26. Id. at 636.
27. Id. at 637.
28. Id.
29. d.
30. Id.
31. 873 F.2d 281 (11th Cir. 1989).
32. Id. at 282.
33. Id.
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arbitration agreements, but if such provisions are absent, federal courts may not
read them in." 34 The court may only decide whether
a written agreement exists
35
to consolidate, and if so, enforce it as written.
The standard arbitration agreements required arbitration only between those
that were parties to each individual contract. 36 Therefore, because the three
parties involved in this case were not parties to one individual agreement, they
never agreed
to consolidation, and the court would not create an agreement for
37
them.
Del E. Webb Constructionv. RichardsonHospitalAuthority38 represents the
Fifth Circuit's approach to addressing the consolidation issue in the context of a
construction contract. Webb, the general contractor, sought to consolidate the
arbitration proceedings with Richardson Hospital Authority (RHA), the owner, and
L.D.W.A., the architect.39 Subsequently, Boyd, a subcontractor, sued Webb.4 °
The contract between owner and architect were standard American Institute of
Architects contracts containing a standard arbitration clause. 41 The contract also
contained language that precluded consolidation of the architect without written
consent. 42 The owner and general contractor entered a contract that also
contained a standard arbitration clause. 43 The court found that the owner could
compel arbitration with the44architect, and the general contractor could compel
arbitration with the owner.
The court was faced with the standard arbitration clause in both contracts
providing that ". . . an arbitration action shall include the owner and the
contractor, 'and any other persons substantially involved in a common question of
fact or law, whose presence is required if complete relief is to be accorded in the
arbitration."' 45 The court concluded that the decision to consolidate rests with
the district court; however, pursuant to section 4 of the FAA, the court may only
determine whether there is a written agreement 4among
the parties providing for
6
consolidated arbitration, and if so, to enforce it.
In the situation before the court in Webb, the architect-owner contract
contained a disclaimer excluding the architect from consolidation. 47 The court
found that the architect had not given specific consent, and the provision in the

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 146-47.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148.
Id., citing the contract between RHA and Webb.
Id. at 150.

47. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1991/iss1/12

4

Blair: Blair: Struggle over Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings Continues:
1991]

CONSOLIDATING ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

contract requiring specific consent, in order
to have meaning, was to be given
48
effect over the standard arbitration clause.
While the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits interpret the court's powers
under the FAA as very
narrow, 49 other circuits have interpreted the same Act
50
with different results.
The Second Circuit decision in Compania Espanola de Petroleos, SA. v.
Nereus Shipping, SA. 51 is a frequently cited case supporting consolidation of
arbitration proceedings. 52 In the context of a maritime contract, Compania
agreed to "perform the balance of the contract" and "assume the rights and
obligations of' the charterer under a contract with Nereus, the agent for the
owner. 53 The district court held that the duty to arbitrate was one of the rights
and obligations assumed by Compania. 54 The Second Circuit agreed with the
district court's ruling consolidating the arbitration between Nereus and Compania
and between Nereus and the charterer. 55 The Second Circuit relied on its
interpretation that the "liberal purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act clearly
require that this act be interpreted so as to permit and even to encourage the
consolidation of arbitration proceedings in proper cases .
,,56 The court
emphasized "[t]here were not only common questions of law and fact in the two
arbitrations but there was danger of conflicting findings .... "157
The First Circuit addressed the consolidation issue in another maritime
context in New England Energy Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co.58 In this case,
New England and Keystone entered a joint venture that provided for arbitration
pursuant to Massachusetts arbitration laws.59 The joint venture of New England
and Keystone then contracted with a ship operator, which contract also included
a provision to arbitrate subject to Massachusetts law. 6° The district court ruled
that the facts were appropriate for consolidation, but declined to order consolidation on the grounds it lacked the power to do so. 6 1 The district court found that
the FAA preempted Massachusetts law providing for consolidation and therefore
deprived the court of the power to consolidate under rule 42(a) of the Federal

48. Id.
49. See Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d 635; Webb, 823 F.2d 145; Protective Life, 873 F.2d 281.
50. See Compania, 527 F.2d 966; New England Energy, 855 F.2d 1.
51. 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976).
52. See Baesler, 900 F.2d at 1194-95; Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d at 636; Webb, 823 F.2d at 149;
New England Energy, 855 F.2d at 4.
53. Compania, 527 F.2d at 969-70.
54. Id. at 974.
55. Id. at 975.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 974.
58. 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988).
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Rules of Civil Procedure. 62 The First Circuit reversed, concluding that under the
Massachusetts statute consolidation was proper.63 However, the court declined
to determine "whether a federal court also has the power, under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 42(a), to order consolidation in the absence of a state law
providing for it." 64 The majority expressly rejected the narrow role of the
courts, that was expressed in Fifth and Ninth Circuit decisions, 65 with regard to
resolving arbitration disputes. 66 The court concluded that, while private
arbitration agreements should be enforced (even if resulting in piecemeal
litigation), the court failed "to see why a state should be prevented from enhancing
the efficiency of the arbitral process, so long as the state procedure does not
directly conflict with a contractual provision." 67 Because the parties' agreements
contained language that called for arbitration of "[a]ny and all differences and
disputes of whatsoever nature," and further, "in the city of Boston pursuant to the
laws relating to arbitration there in force," the parties therefore affirmatively
agreed to the possibility of consolidation by invoking applicable Massachusetts law
as well as the FAA. 68
.The dissenting opinion in New England Energy focuses on the concern that
by ordering consolidation, something the parties did not specifically agree to, the
court is substituting "our judgment for that of the parties," 69 and not proceeding
70
"inaccordance with the terms [of the agreement.]"
These courts were each faced with different fact patterns, different arbitration
agreements, and different parties. Central to
each dispute, however, was the FAA
71
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Each court received the authority to enforce the privately negotiated
arbitration agreements from the FAA.72 Section 2, Title 9, provides for the
validity and enforceability of agreements to arbitrate:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d 635; Webb, 823 F.2d 145.
66. New England Energy, 855 F.2d at 7.
67. Id., 855 F.2d at 7.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 9.
70. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
71. See Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d at 636; Webb, 823 F.2d at 149; Protective Life, 873 F.2d at 282;
Compania, 527 F.2d at 968; New EnglandEnergy, 855 F.2d at 3.
72. See Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d at 637; Webb, 823 F.2d at 147-48; Protective, 873 F.2d at 282;
Compania, 527 F.2d at 968; New England, 855 F.2d at 3.
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contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such73grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
Section 4, Title 9, further provides the court with the authority to compel
arbitration:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another
to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any
United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have
jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for
an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided
for in such agreement ....The court shall hear the parties, and upon
being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed
to arbitration in accordance with the
4
terms of the agreement.
It is this emphasized language that the courts struggle to interpret. At one
extreme, courts interpret this language narrowly ordering consolidation only if the
parties explicitly agree to it in the terms of the agreement. 75 Other courts will
work to find that the parties implicitly provided for consolidation based on the
76
language in the agreement and the circumstances.
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are used in the analysis, there is
even greater room for the courts to create the desired result. 77 With respect to
the applicability of the Federal Rules to arbitration proceedings, Rule 81(a)(3)
provides:
In proceedings under Title 9, U.S.C., relating to arbitration, or under the
Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 347, 9 (44 Stat. 585), U.S.C., Title 45, 159,
relating to boards of arbitration of railway labor disputes, these rules
apply only to the78extent that matters of procedure are not provided for
in those statutes.

73. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947) (emphasis added).
See Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d at 637; Webb, 823 F.2d at 150; Protective Life, 873 F.2d at 282.
See New England Energy, 855 F.2d at 7.
See generally MacKellar, supra note 6.
FED.R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3).
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Because it seems that the Federal Rules will apply to arbitration proceedings
where Title 9 does not provide otherwise, 79 some courts may make use of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 42(a), which provides:
(a) consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law
or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial
of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the
actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceed80
ings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Rule 42 gives courts the authority to consolidate "actions," which arguably
81
may be interpreted in light of Rule 81(a)(3) to include arbitration proceedings.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The Eighth Circuit faced a situation where the parties agreed to arbitrate, and
the agreements were silent as to consolidation. 82 The court acknowledged
83
previous decisions of other federal circuit courts regarding the issue of consolidation.
With regard to the Second Circuit decision in Compania,84 the Eighth
Circuit summarized the theory justifying consolidation whereby district courts have
the power to consolidate based on the liberal purpose of the FAA's fostering
dispute resolution and based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 81(a)(3) and
42(a).8 5
The Baesler Court dismissed the First Circuit decision, finding that the
district court had the power to consolidate, because the First Circuit was faced
with a state statute specifically authorizing consolidation. 86 There was no such
87
statute before the Eighth Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the decisions of the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits in finding the narrow construction of section 4 of the FAA requiring
courts to enforce privately made arbitration agreements as written. 88 The
majority cited to a Supreme Court decision 89 regarding the guiding purpose of
the FAA which had "explicitly rejected the assertion that the overriding goal of

79. Id.
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
81. MacKellar, supra note 6, at 15-16.
82. Baesler, 900 F.2d at 1194.
83. Id. at 1194-95.
84. 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976).
85. Baesler, 900 F.2d at 1194-95.
86. Id. at 1195.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Surman v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984).
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the Act is to promote the expeditious resolution of claims." 90 The Eighth Circuit
recognized the Supreme Court's general interpretation in Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd,9 1 which held that the Act "was motivated, first and foremost, by
92
a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered."
Accordingly, the Baesler court, echoing the sentiments of the Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits, concluded that, "we read the Federal Arbitration Act as
requiring federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements as they are written.
Accordingly, we hold that absent a provision in an arbitration agreement
authorizing consolidation, a district court is without power to consolidate
arbitration proceedings." 93 Interestingly, Circuit Judge Brown, sitting by
designation from the Fifth Circuit, disagreed with the Eighth Circuit majority, and
filed a dissenting opinion.94 Judge Brown disagreed with the position of the
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, and recognized that the First Circuit holding
was distinguishable because of the presence of a specific state statute. 95 Judge
Brown advocates the Second Circuit96position, "permit[ting] and encourag[ing]"
consolidation in proper proceedings.
Judge Brown refers to an earlier Supreme Court case, Textile Workers Union
of America v. Lincoln Mills,97 which began a trend toward "expanding the use
and scope of the arbitration process." 98 Consolidation in Baesler, Judge Brown
argues, would support the arbitration process resulting in economic feasibility and
efficiency. 99 Judge Brown recognized the opportunity for the courts to play a
significant role in encouraging and expanding the
arbitration process and believed
100
that the courts should indeed play such a role.
As each case before the federal circuit courts has unique facts, an important
point to make may be what Judge Brown alluded to in his dissent. That is, the
facts in Baesler are different from the other mentioned decisions in that, rather
than having the traditional vertical consolidation where A contracts with B and B
contracts with C, Continental had many agreements with similarly situated third
parties. 10 1 Judge Brown concluded that in this somewhat different contract
pattern, the0 2Second Circuit rationale promoting use of consolidation is even more
1
powerful.

90. Baesler, 900 F.2d at 1195.
91. 470 U.S. 213.
92. Baesler, 900 F.2d at 1195 (quoting Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 220).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1195-96.
96. Id. at 1196.
97. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
98. Baesler, 900 F.2d at 1196.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. ld.
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V. COMMENT

Based on the smorgasbord of circuit court decisions, the issue of consolidation appears ripe for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. However, 10in3
several cases, the parties applied for writ and the Supreme Court denied it.
Such action by the Supreme Court seems to encourage the district courts to
interpretation and use of privately negotiated
continue to exercise discretionary
10 4
arbitration agreements.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that arbitration should remain a viable
alternative method for resolving disputes, 10 5 and apparently is content to leave
up to the individual
the predominately procedural issues, such as consolidation,
10 6
district courts to be decided on a case by case basis.
If it is not an impossible task, to extract some rhyme or reason out of
seemingly conflicting decisions, it appears that agreements to arbitrate are to be
enforced, pursuant to section 4 of the FAA. 10 7 If the parties specifically
provide for the manner of enforcement then these instructions are to be followed; 10 8 if the parties do not specifically address issues such as consolidation,
the courts will look at factors such as the nature of the agreement, the relationship
between the parties, whether an implied agreement may be garnered either from
the language in the agreement or the applicable state laws, and finally, the
what each party has at stake in the
equitable concerns of the court regarding
10 9
enforcement or denial of consolidation.
ScoTr E. BLAIR

103. See Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d 635.
104. MacKellar, supra note 6, at 30.
105. See Dean Witier, 470 U.S. 213.
106. See Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d 635; Compania, 527 F.2d 966. The Supreme Court denied writs
of certiorari in each case.
107. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947).
108. Baesler, 900 F.2d at 1195.
109. See Compania, 527 F.2d at 972-75; New England Energy, 855 F.2d at 2-3; Webb, 823 F.2d
at 149-50.
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